Upgrading to 0.6.21
2026-11-13. The kafka and amqp (AMQP 1.0) transports connect to TLS brokers natively, with no sidecar, and authenticate with SASL: Kafka with PLAIN, SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-512, AMQP 1.0 with PLAIN. Brokers are verified by default. FEEL gains password hash and password verify (argon2id), so a flow can sign a user in against a password hash in a typed store without storing or logging the password. The CLI’s self-update works on macOS, and paths printed on Windows no longer carry a \\?\ prefix. There is no migration, and no archive format, deploymentId or snapshot format change.
Before you upgrade
Check these against what you run:
- Kafka’s
kafka.*passthrough now refusessasl.*,ssl.*andenable.ssl.certificate.verification. A channel that sets one of them stops at startup. Use the typed properties below instead. They could not have secured a connection before, because the engine’s Kafka client was built without TLS. - A Kafka
sasl.username,sasl.passwordortls-ca-pemwritten as a literal is refused withSUTRA.STARTUP.REFUSED.HARDCODED_SECRET, like the AMQP and RabbitMQ credentials. Write a reference. - A plaintext AMQP sink whose credentials the broker refuses now reports
SUTRA.OUTBOUND.AMQP.BROKER_AUTH_FAILED, where it reportedSEND_FAILED. Update an alert that matches the old code. - The engine binary now includes its own OpenSSL 3.6.3, for the Kafka client (librdkafka has no other TLS backend). The engine still loads no system libssl:
readelf -dlists only libgcc_s, libm, libc and the loader. An image scanner cannot see this copy; it is tracked throughrust/Cargo.lock, socargo auditreports an advisory filed against theopenssl-srccrate. The image is about 8 MB larger. Building from source now needsperl, for OpenSSL’s build.
TLS and SASL on Kafka and AMQP 1.0
For an inbound channel:
| Property | Transport | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
security.protocol | kafka | PLAINTEXT (default), SSL, SASL_PLAINTEXT or SASL_SSL |
sasl.mechanism | kafka | PLAIN, SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-512 |
sasl.username, sasl.password | kafka | References, never literals |
tls: true | amqp | Use TLS. The default port becomes 5671 |
username, password | amqp | References. SASL PLAIN is used when both are set |
tls-ca-file | both | A PEM bundle used in place of the system CAs. Takes references, like an address |
tls-ca-pem | both | A reference to PEM text, used in place of the system CAs |
tls-insecure-skip-verify | both | true turns off the certificate and host-name checks |
- Verification is on by default, against the system CAs (
SSL_CERT_FILEandSSL_CERT_DIRare honoured), unless a CA setting replaces them.tls-insecure-skip-verify: trueis the only way to turn it off, and the engine logs a warning whenever it applies. - A setting that could not take effect stops the channel at startup instead of being ignored: a CA setting without TLS,
sasl.*without a SASL protocol, both CA settings at once, or SASL GSSAPI or OAUTHBEARER. - The protocol switches stay literal.
tls,security.protocol,sasl.mechanismandtls-insecure-skip-verifydo not expand references; addresses, credentials andtls-ca-filedo. - Outbound sends use one engine-wide setting per transport, from the environment:
SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_SECURITY_PROTOCOL,SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_SASL_MECHANISM,SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_SASL_USERNAME,SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_SASL_PASSWORD,SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_TLS_CA_FILE,SUTRA_SINK_KAFKA_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY; and foramqp10s://destinationsSUTRA_SINK_AMQP_TLS_CA_FILEandSUTRA_SINK_AMQP_TLS_INSECURE_SKIP_VERIFY, with the existingSUTRA_SINK_AMQP_USERNAMEandSUTRA_SINK_AMQP_PASSWORD. - New diagnostics:
SUTRA.INBOUND.KAFKA.BROKER_TLS_FAILED,SUTRA.INBOUND.KAFKA.BROKER_AUTH_FAILED, the same two underOUTBOUND.KAFKA,INBOUND.AMQPandOUTBOUND.AMQP.BROKER_TLS_FAILEDmeans the broker’s certificate is not trusted or does not name the host, or the trust settings could not be read;BROKER_AUTH_FAILEDmeans the broker refused the credentials. Neither prints a password or anything the broker sent back during SASL. A consumer keeps retrying and an outbound message stays in the outbox, so both recover once the setting is corrected. The AMQP consumer backs off between attempts; the Kafka client retries quickly and logs each attempt, so a wrong CA gives dozens of lines a second: alert on the code, not the line count. - What it was tested against: Apache Kafka 3.8 and Apache ActiveMQ Artemis, in local containers. Managed Kafka services and Azure Service Bus have not been tested and are not claimed to work; Azure Service Bus’s CBS token flow is not implemented. Client certificates (mTLS) are not supported.
The walkthrough is Connecting to a TLS and SASL broker: a message through both brokers, a refused login and an untrusted CA.
Password hashing in FEEL
password hash(password)returns an argon2id hash in PHC string form ($argon2id$v=19$m=19456,t=2,p=1$…), with a fresh 16-byte salt from the operating system. The parameters are fixed in code. An empty or non-string password givesnull.password verify(password, hash)returnstrueorfalse, comparing in constant time. It returnsnullfor a malformed hash, one that is not argon2id, or one that asks for more than m = 65 536 KiB, t = 10 or p = 4, so a stored hash cannot make a verify arbitrarily expensive.password hashis denied where an expression must give the same answer on replay, likeuuid():sutra lintrefuses it there withSUTRA.FEEL.DETERMINISM.UNSAFE_BUILTIN.password verifyis deterministic and allowed everywhere.- Cost: one verify takes about 22 ms (criterion median 22.3 ms, range 21.1 to 23.8 ms, on an Intel i7-10750H laptop, release build).
- Keep the plaintext out of every surface by reading the sign-in message into a variable marked
transientandsensitive: it is then neither persisted nor written to the audit log or the engine log. Signing a user in against a store builds such a flow, and checks the database dump, the audit file and the engine log for the password. - New dependency:
argon20.5 (withpassword-hashandblake2), with default features off.
CLI on macOS and Windows
sutra self-updateworks on macOS. It passed GNU tar’s--wildcards, which macOS’s bsdtar refuses. It now unpacks the archive into a scratch folder and takes the binary from there.- Windows paths are printed without the
\\?\prefix. Package loading,sutra lint,sutra createand the documentation generators resolve paths without it, so a printed path or a path comparison matches what you typed. The catalog’s JSONrepoRootshowed it. sutra compat-baselineagainst a git reference givestara relative archive name, because GNU tar, which Git for Windows puts first onPATH, readsC:\…as a remote host.- These were tested on Linux, which exercises the Linux-visible half of each. A new hosted job,
cli-portability, runs the CLI and package-loader tests and clippy on macOS 15 and Windows Server 2025 for every change; its first run is this release’s.
Building and CI
make ciruns the hosted pipeline’s checks locally, cheapest first:make fmt-check,make lint,make cross,make test,make auditandmake scan-deps.make testruns cargo-nextest when it is installed, plus the doctests, and otherwisecargo test; both run every test before reporting. The hosted pipeline installs nextest.make crossruns clippy for the CLI and its workspace crates against Windows (MSVC) and both macOS targets, skipping a target whose C toolchain the host lacks.- The workflows pin every action by commit and every runner by version, and are checked with actionlint. A new architecture test fails the build when a workflow’s Rust toolchain differs from
rust-toolchain.toml. .gitattributesmakes text files LF in every checkout. The BPMN and DMN schemas published by the OMG are kept byte for byte as published.
Security
- The image scan configuration’s justifications for the base image’s libssl3 now say why: the engine links no libssl, and its Kafka client’s OpenSSL is compiled in (see “Before you upgrade”).
- Seven new base-image findings are ignored, time-boxed, with their reasons in
.trivyignore.yaml: five in libssl3 (CMS, QUIC and AES-GCM-SIV), which the engine never loads and whose code paths its compiled-in OpenSSL does not use for TLS over TCP, and two in glibc (regex and the widescanffamily). Debian ships no fix for any of them. quinn-proto0.11.19 andquinn-udp0.5.16 inCargo.lock, for RUSTSEC-2026-0523, RUSTSEC-2026-0524 and RUSTSEC-2026-0538. Neither crate is compiled into the engine or the CLI; they are in the lockfile only as an optional dependency ofreqwestthat no crate enables (cargo tree -i quinn-proto -e all --target allis empty).
For extension authors
sutra_transport_spi::is_secret_referenceis new: whether a value is a whole secret reference (any registered scheme,${…}, ork8s:secret/<name>#<key>).sutra-transport-amqpgainsAmqpTlsProperties,register_amqp_sink_with_tls,sink_tls_settings_from_envandAmqpMessageSink::with_tls_settings, andAmqpChannelPropertiesatls_settingsfield.sutra-transport-kafkagainsKafkaBrokerSecurity,KafkaSinkSecurity,register_kafka_sink_with_securityandKafkaMessageSink::with_security, andKafkaChannelPropertiesasecurityfield.BrokerFailureRecorderis new. Code that buildsAmqpChannelPropertiesorKafkaChannelPropertieswith a struct literal must add the new field.